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Dear Sir,
Please can you advise what the author is implying in simple terms from the below paragraph (from Stakeholders part 2 technical article):
“Even in companies where excellent procedures are put in place to assess operational level controls, it is hard to imagine how IA can fully monitor strategic controls. It would be very hard to design a corporate governance structure in which even the most independent IA department had a mechanism to do much more than check that procedures have been followed at board level. The board ultimately has to be responsible for the proper working of strategic level controls. This is also illustrative of the way IA fits in to overall corporate governance. The corporate governance big picture has to be addressed if IA is going to be effective. A domineering CEO cannot be countered by the existence of an IA department. Indeed, interference in the work of internal audit would indicate broader corporate governance problems.”
Thanks very much
I think what it means is that if the board, which we asume consists of well-qualified people, makes strategic decisions, it is going ro be difficult for IA to second-guess those high-level decisions. It is hard to see how IA can fundamentally question or usurp the board’s decisions.
The last sentence seems to be a non-sequitur.
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